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Unembedded Indirect Discourse
Corien BARY — Radboud University Nijmegen
Emar MAIER — University of Groningen
Abstract. This paper contributes to two debates: (i) the debate about whether or not ancient
Greek has Free Indirect Discourse (FID), and (ii) the debate about how we should analyze FID
semantically. We do this by showing that there is a distinction between FID and what we call
Unembedded Indirect Discourse (UID). The semantic analysis that we develop for the latter shows
that the two phenomena, though superﬁcially similar, are semantically fundamentally different.
We conclude that UID would have been more deserving of the title ‘free indirect discourse’ than
the more quotative and direct discourse-like narrative technique that is now confusingly called so.1
Keywords: speech reports, Free Indirect Discourse, ancient Greek, subjunctive, oblique optative.
1. Introduction
There are conspicuously diverging opinions about whether or not ancient Greek has Free Indirect
Discourse. In narratology and classical studies we ﬁnd several authors express the view that the
style can be traced back to ancient Greek, for instance in the Handbook of Narratology:
FID, though already present in ancient Greek and Latin literature and in biblical nar-
rative, would not be identiﬁed until the last decades of the 19th century. ?McHale 2009?
On the other hand, there is a common view that Free Indirect Discourse is a more recent invention:
The claim that instances of the style can be found in Greek and Latin ﬁnds little cre-
dence . . . and no plausible examples have been proferred to support this claim.
?
Banﬁeld 1982: 228
?
Quite independently there has been considerable debate within formal semantics about how best
to analyze Free Indirect Discourse. In particular there is an ongoing debate between, for instance,
proponents of theories in terms of double context dependence (Schlenker, 2004; Eckardt, 2012);2
monstrous indirect discourse (Sharvit, 2008); and (mixed) quotation (Maier, 2012).
We want to contribute to both debates by introducing a distinction between Free Indirect Discourse
(FID) and what we call Unembedded Indirect Discourse (UID). More speciﬁcally, in this paper
we (i) describe the phenomeon of UID as distinct from FID in ancient Greek, and (ii) propose
1We thank Dag Haug, Kjell Johan Sæbø, Rob van der Sandt, Peter de Swart, Sammie Tarenskeen, Bob van Tiel,
Jan-Wouter Zwart, and the audiences of Sinn und Bedeutung 2013 and INSEMP for their useful suggestions. The
research for this paper is supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research (NWO), Veni grant 275-
20-025 (Corien Bary), and by the EU under FP7, ERC Starting Grants 263890-BLENDS (Emar Maier) and 338421-
PERSPECTIVE (Corien Bary).
2Going back to ideas of Banﬁeld (1982).
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an analysis based on Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s (2004) presuppositional analysis of a similar
phenomenon in German. We conclude that failure to recognize the distinction between FID and
UID may have contributed to (a) an overestimation of the occurrence of FID in older texts, and (b)
the classiﬁcation of FID as a kind of indirect discourse.
2. Unembedded Indirect Discourse in ancient Greek
In ancient Greek indirect discourse, a verb of saying can take as its complement
a. a regular indicative ﬁnite that-clause;
b. a ﬁnite that-clause with the verb in a special mood, called the optative;
c. an inﬁnitival clause.
In (1) we see (constructed) examples of each, all reporting the utterance γρ?φω grapho¯ ‘I am
writing’:
(1) a. ?λε?εν
elexen
he-said
?τι
hoti
that
γρ?φει
graphei
he-is-writing
b. ?λε?εν
elexen
he-said
?τι
hoti
that
γρ?φοι
graphoi
he-is-writing-OPT
c. ?φη
ephe¯
he-said
γρ?φειν
graphein
to-write
Ad (1a): ancient Greek is a non-Sequence-of-Tense language. Hence the present tense in the
complement (retained from the original utterance without modiﬁcation). Ad (1b): the use of the
optative in speech reports is called the oblique optative. It is subjunctive-like in the sense that
in other languages, such as German, we often ﬁnd the subjunctive mood (Konjunktiv in German)
used in similar ways.3 Ad (1c): in such inﬁnitival constructions, ancient Greek does not express
the subject of the complement’s main verb if it is the same as that of the matrix verb, as in (1c). If
it is not the same, it uses accusative case. So literally ‘he-said her to-write’ translates as ‘he said
that she was writing’. This construction is called the accusative-with-inﬁnitive construction, AcI
(Accusativus cum Inﬁnitivo) for short.
Interestingly, when an author wants to report a longer discourse indirectly, he can continue to use
the latter two indirectness markings (oblique optative or AcI) for several syntactically independent
sentences, i.e. main clauses not embedded under verbs of saying. We see this for example in (2):4
3To avoid confusion: apart from the optative, ancient Greek also has a mood that is traditionally called the sub-
junctive. That mood is not related to speech reports and will not be discussed here.
4Throughout this paper we use the following conventions: verbs of saying are marked with bold face; inﬁnitives
are underlined (the accusatives belonging to these inﬁnitives are not marked); optatives are double underlined; and we
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(2) Περσ?ων µ?ν νυν ο? λ?γιοι Φο?νικας α?τ?ους φασ? γεν?σθαι τ?ς διαφορ?ς? το?τους
γ?ρ, ?π? τ?ς ?Ερυθρ?ς καλεοµ?νης θαλ?σσης ?πικοµ?νους ?π? τ?νδε τ?ν θ?λασσαν
κα? ο?κ?σαντας το?τον τ?ν χ?ρον τ?ν κα? ν?ν ο?κ?ουσι, α?τ?κα ναυτιλ?η?σι µακρ??-
σι ?πιθ?σθαι, ?παγιν?οντας δ? φορτ?α Α?γ?πτι? τε κα? ?Ασσ?ρια τ?? τε ?λλη? [χ?ρη?]
?σαπικν?εσθαι κα? δ? κα? ?ς ?Αργος? τ? δ? ?Αργος το?τον τ?ν χρ?νον προε?χε ?πασι
τ?ν ?ν τ?? ν?ν ?Ελλ?δι καλεοµ?νη? χ?ρη?. ?Απικοµ?νους δ? το?ς Φο?νικας ?ς δ? τ? ?Αργος
το?το διατ?θεσθαι τ?ν φ?ρτον. Π?µπτη? δ? ? ?κτη? ?µ?ρη? ?π? ?ς ?π?κοντο, ??εµπολη-
µ?νων σφι σχεδ?ν π?ντων, ?λθε?ν ?π? τ?ν θ?λασσαν γυνα?κας ?λλας τε πολλ?ς κα? δ?
κα? το? βασιλ?ος θυγατ?ρα? τ? δ? ο? ο?νοµα ε?ναι, κατ? τ?υτ? τ? κα? ?Ελληνες λ?γου-
σι, ?Ιο?ν τ?ν ?Ιν?χου. Τα?τας στ?σας κατ? πρ?µνην τ?ς νε?ς ?ν?εσθαι τ?ν φορτ?ων
τ?ν σφι ?ν θυµ?ς µ?λιστα, κα? το?ς Φο?νικας διακελευσαµ?νους ?ρµ?σαι ?π? α?τ?ς.
Τ?ς µ?ν δ? πλ?ονας τ?ν γυναικ?ν ?ποφυγε?ν, τ?ν δ? ?Ιο?ν σ?ν ?λλη?σι ?ρπασθ?ναι?
?σβαλοµ?νους δ? ?ς τ?ν ν?α ο?χεσθαι ?ποπλ?οντας ?π? Α?γ?πτου. Ο?τω µ?ν ?Ιο?ν ?ς
Α?γυπτον ?πικ?σθαι λ?γουσι Π?ρσαι, ο?κ ?ς ?Ελληνες, κα? τ?ν ?δικηµ?των πρ?τον
το?το ?ρ?αι? Hdt. 1.1
‘The Persian learned men say that the Phoenicians were the cause of the dispute. These
(they say) came to our seas from the sea which is called Red, and having settled in the
country which they still occupy, at once began to make long voyages. Among other places
to which they carried Egyptian and Assyrian merchandise, they came to Argos, which was
at that time preeminent in every way among the people of what is now called Hellas. The
Phoenicians came to Argos, and set out their cargo. On the ﬁfth or sixth day after their
arrival, when their wares were almost all sold, many women came to the shore and among
them especially the daughter of the king, whose name was Io (according to Persians and
Greeks alike), the daughter of Inachus. As these stood about the stern of the ship bargain-
ing for the wares they liked, the Phoenicians incited one another to set upon them. Most of
the women escaped: Io and others were seized and thrown into the ship, which then sailed
away for Egypt. In this way, the Persians say (and not as the Greeks), was how Io came to
Egypt, and this, according to them, was the ﬁrst wrong that was done.’
This whole passage is an AcI report of what the Persians said.5 Verbs of saying occur only twice:
once at the beginning (φασ? phasi ‘said’) and once at the very end (λ?γουσι legousi ‘said’) . The
inﬁnitive in the ﬁrst sentence, γεν?σθαι genesthai ‘to be’ depends on the former syntactically, as
we would expect. But then this inﬁnitival construction is continued for several sentences, without
the verb of saying being repeated.6 The inﬁnitive in these sentences still indicates that we have to
do with a report of what the Persians said, but syntactically it does not depend on a verb of saying
use double spacing to highlight other elements of the example.
5The fact that not all English ﬁnite verb forms are underlined may give the impression that in the Greek text there
is an alternation between inﬁnitival and ﬁnite verb forms. All the verbs that are not underlined in Greek, however, are
either participles or ﬁnite forms in clauses subordinated to the AcI construction.
6‘They say’ is added in the second line of the English translation to make clear that the report is continued, it is
absent in the Greek text.
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anymore.7
In fact, even the initial, overt indirect speech embedding is not necessary: an implicit or paren-
thetical say may sufﬁce (cf. Cooper 1974). (3) is an example where the saying is expressed only
parenthetically:
(3) ?Υπ? δ? µεγ?θεος τ?ς π?λιος, ?ς λ?γεται ?π? τ?ν τα?τη? ο?κηµ?νων, τ?ν περ? τ?
?σχατα τ?ς π?λιος ?λωκ?των το?ς τ? µ?σον ο?κ?οντας τ?ν Βαβυλων?ων ο? µανθ?νειν
?λωκ?τας, ?λλ? (τυχε?ν γ?ρ σφι ?ο?σαν ?ρτ?ν) χορε?ειν τε το?τον τ?ν χρ?νον κα?
?ν ε?παθε?η?σι ε?ναι, ?ς ? δ? κα? τ? κ?ρτα ?π?θοντο. Hdt. 1.191
‘because of the great size of the city, those who dwell there say, the inhabitants of the
middle part did not know that those in the outer parts of it were overcome; all this time
(since there happened to be a festival) they were dancing and enjoying themselves, until
they learned the truth only too well.’
The AcI construction does not depend on the verb of saying λ?γεται legetai syntactically, since
that verb occurs in a parenthetical construction. Nevertheless, the AcI does indicate that we have
to do with a speech report.
In (4) the saying is only implicit:
(4) τ?ν µ?ν δ? προτ?ρων ?πρ?σβευε ?Αρτοβαζ?νης, τ?ν δ? ?πιγενοµ?νων ??ρ?ης. ?Ε?ντες
δ? µητρ?ς ο? τ?ς α?τ?ς ?στασ?αζον, ? µ?ν [γ?ρ] ?Αρτοβαζ?νης κατ? ? τι πρεσβ?τατ?ς
τε ε?η παντ?ς το? γ?νου κα? ?τι νοµιζ?µενον ε?η πρ?ς π?ντων ?νθρ?πων τ?ν πρεσβ?-
τατον τ?ν ?ρχ?ν ?χειν, ??ρ?ης δ? ?ς ?Ατ?σσης τε πα?ς ε?η τ?ς Κ?ρου θυγατρ?ς κα?
?τι Κ?ρος ε?η ? κτησ?µενος το?σι Π?ρση?σι τ?ν ?λευθερ?ην. Hdt. 7.2
‘Artobazanes was the oldest of the earlier sons, Xerxes of the later; and as sons of differ-
ent mothers they were rivals. Artobazanes (pleaded that he) was the oldest of all Darius’
offspring and that it was everywhere customary that the eldest should rule; Xerxes (argued
that he) was the son of Cyrus’ daughter Atossa and that it was Cyrus who had won the
Persians their freedom.’
Here the optative is the only formal indicator that we have to do with a report (‘pleaded that he’ is
added twice in the English translation to indicate the reportive status).
We coin the phenomenon illustrated in (2), (3), and (4) Unembedded Indirect Discourse. It shares
some remarkable characteristics with the narrative technique called FID, of which (5) is a canonical
example:
(5) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday the beginning of another school week.
Both report modes
7One of the reasons why it cannot be one long sentence is the presence of the word γ?ρ gar in the second line,
which always introduces a main clause.
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(i) are reportive: in (5) the story protagonist’s thought or speech is reported
(ii) are syntactically unembedded: a verb of saying is absent or given only parenthetically
(iii) have pronouns and tenses behave as in indirect discourse: in (5) the past tense of was
corresponds to what an indirect discourse report (6a) rather than a direct discourse
report (6b) would be like.
(6) a. He realized that the next day was Monday
b. He thought: ‘Tomorrow is Monday.’
These similarities raise the question whether we have to do with FID here. In other words, is UID
a form of FID?
In order to answer that question, we need to get a clearer picture of what distinguishes FID from
indirect discourse. We see the difference between the two with various classes of linguistic expres-
sions.8 Table 1 gives an overview.9
FID indirect discourse
non-pronominal indexicals always protagonist-oriented always narrator-oriented
attitudinal particles always protagonist-oriented ??
exclamatives can occur impossible
Table 1: FID versus indirect discourse
Although pronouns and tenses in FID behave as in indirect discourse, all other indexical expres-
sions behave differently. While, for example, the indexical adverb tomorrow in (5) is interpreted
from the perspective of the character or protagonist in the story, such a protagonist-oriented read-
ing is impossible in indirect discourse where such indexical expressions are to be interpreted from
the perspective of the actual speaker or narrator (hence the change to the next day in (6a) in order
to report the same content).
As for attitudinal particles (such as German doch, ja, wohl), it seems that more work needs to be
done before anything decisive can be said about their behavior in both constructions. But Eckardt’s
(2012) work on particles in FID suggests that in that construction they are protagonist-oriented.
Finally, exclamatives like hurray can occur in FID but not in indirect discourse.
8Such differences have been listed by many linguists and narratologists, among whom, for example Banﬁeld (1982)
and Schlenker (2004).
9This list is not exhaustive. Other differences that have been mentioned in the literature are, for example, the
presence of direct questions and vocatives.
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It turns out that if we look at the UID cases in ancient Greek, none of the indicators that point into
the direction of FID is found there.10 To the contrary, we do ﬁnd indicators that point into the direc-
tion of indirect discourse. We see this, for example, when we look at deﬁnite descriptions. Deﬁnite
descriptions in FID are protagonist-oriented (i.e. interpreted from the perspective of the reported
speaker), whereas in indirect discourse they can be both protagonist-oriented and narrator-oriented
(interpreted from the perspective of the actual speaker). (7) is an indirect discourse example:
(7) Oedipus believed that his mother was not his mother.
This sentence in principle has two readings. A non-sensical protagonist-oriented or de dicto read-
ing in which Oedipus believes something like ‘My mother is not my mother’ (he believes in a
contradiction), and a narrator-oriented or de re reading in which Oedipus believes of someone who
the narrator refers to as his mother – Oedipus himself may think about this person in terms of e.g.
Iocaste rather than my mother – that this person is not his mother.
By contrast, (8), the equivalent in FID, only has the contradictory protagonist-oriented reading:
(8) His mother was not his mother, Oedipus believed.
FID indirect discourse
deﬁnite descriptions always protagonist-oriented both protagonist-oriented and
narrator-oriented are possible
Table 2: FID versus indirect discourse (continued)
In other words, narrator-oriented readings of deﬁnite descriptions tell us that we have to do with
indirect discourse rather than FID. And indeed, such readings are available for the UID cases in
ancient Greek, showing that UID is not a form of FID. (9) is an example:
(9) Σκ?θαι µ?ν ?δε ?π?ρ σφ?ων τε α?τ?ν κα? τ?ς χ?ρης τ?ς κατ?περθε λ?γουσι, ?Ελλ?νων
δ? ο? τ?ν Π?ντον ο?κ?οντες ?δε. ?Ηρακλ?α ?λα?νοντα τ?ς Γηρυ?νεω βο?ς ?πικ?σθαι
?ς γ?ν τα?την ?ο?σαν ?ρ?µην, ?ντινα ν?ν Σκ?θαι ν?µονται. Γηρυ?νην δ? ο?κ?ειν ??ω
το? Π?ντου, κατοικηµ?νον τ ? ν ?Ε λ λ η ν ε ς λ ? γ ο υ σ ι ?Ε ρ ? θ ε ι α ν ν ? σ ο ν,
τ?ν πρ?ς Γηδε?ροισι το?σι ??ω ?Ηρακλ?ων στηλ?ων ?π? τ?? ?Ωκεαν?? Hdt. 4.8
‘This is what the Scythians say about themselves and the country north of them, but the
Greeks tell the story as follows: Heracles, driving the cattle of Geryones, came to this land,
which was then desolate, but is now inhabited by the Scythians. Geryones lived west of
the Pontus, settled in t h e i s l a n d t h a t t h e G r e e k s c a l l E r y t h e i a, on the
shore of Ocean near Gadira, outside the pillars of Heracles.’
10Herodotus is the most prominent user of this construction. Cooper (1974) has selected the occurrences in his
work (many of which are quite long) and this formed our corpus, supplemented with examples in grammars and other
secondary literature.
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In (9) it is clear that the phrase the island that the Greeks call Erytheia originates from Herodotus
rather than from the Greeks whose speech he is reporting (who probably simply said Erytheia or
maybe the island we call Erytheia).11
To conclude, whereas FID patterns with direct discourse in many respects, we see that the cases
of UID are really cases of indirect discourse, albeit indirect discourse that is not syntactically
embedded, a class of speech reports that, as far as we know, has not been recognized as such before
in the semantic literature. We will discuss the position of this construction within the taxonomy of
reported speech and thought in the conclusion.
Having shown that UID is a kind of indirect discourse, in the next section we will give it a semantic
analysis in which it is treated accordingly.
3. The Reportive Subjunctive as a presupposition trigger
To provide a semantic analysis of the phenomenon of unembedded indirect discourse in ancient
Greek, we borrow from an existing analysis of a remarkably similar phenomenon in German, the
so-called Reportive Subjunctive (also known in German linguistics as the Indirektheitskonjunktiv
or Konjunktiv der indirekten Rede). We start by introducing this German subjunctive mood, and
then present an analysis based on Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø’s (2004) idea that this mood mor-
phology triggers a presupposition. We then apply this analysis to the Greek oblique optative, and
ﬁnally extend it to the AcI.
3.1. The reportive subjunctive in German
The Reportive Subjunctive is a special use of the German subjunctive mood that occurs in com-
plements of indirect discourse reports (Ja¨ger, 1971). We will not be concerned with any other uses
of the German subjunctive, e.g. in conditionals, or the differences between the two distinct forms
usually referred to as Konjunktiv I and Konjunktiv II. We will also ignore differences between
verb-second and verb-ﬁnal complements, and questions about exactly which classes of verbs other
than verba dicendi may license this subjunctive in their complements.
Our starting point then is the observation that German, like ancient Greek, has a morphologically
realized mood that is licensed by an indirect discourse construction. Here’s an example from
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004):
(10) Er
he
behauptete,
claimed
dass
that
jemand
somebody
das
the
Auto
car
angefahren
on-driven
habe
have.subj
11Similarly, it seems that many of the proper names in UID would be pronouns rather than proper names in FID. It
is however hard to compare the two in this respect since the use of proper names in FID needs further investigation.
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‘He claimed that somebody had driven into the car’
Moreover, this extra marking of the indirect discourse construction is optional and semantically
superﬂuous. According to Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004), there is no semantic difference
between (10) and the variant with embedded indicative:
(11) Er behauptete, dass jemand das Auto angefahren hat
To explain such data, Schlenker (2003) proposes to analyze the reportive subjunctive as a lo-
gophoric mood, i.e., what we see in (10) is the phonological realization of a possible world variable
decorated with a logophoricity feature that forces it to be bound by the reporting verb. How-
ever, just like the Greek oblique optative, the reportive subjunctive can occur in independent main
clauses, as UID, we hypothesize. This may be as a “continuation” of an earlier, overtly embedded
indirect discourse:
(12) Er
He
sagte,
said
sie
she
sei
be.subj
scho¨n.
beautiful.
Sie
She
habe
have.subj
gru¨ne
green
Augen
eyes
‘He said she was beautiful. She had green eyes, he said.’ ?Ja¨ger 1971?
The ﬁrst sentence is a standard indirect discourse (in verb second form), featuring the (semanti-
cally superﬂuous) reportive subjunctive. This sentence would mean the same in verb ﬁnal form
(with complementizer dass (‘that’)), and with indicative instead of subjunctive mood. The second
sentence is an unembedded, syntactically independent main clause. In the indicative it would sim-
ply mean that she has green eyes, but the subjunctive forces a reportive reading, viz., he (also) said
that she had green eyes.
For examples like (12), a Schlenker-style analysis would have to invoke a mechanism of modal
subordination. But given that subjunctive marked unembedded indirect discourses can also occur
(both in German and in Greek) without any introductory embedded indirect discourse, this turns
into positing covert saying verbs. We propose a less ad hoc solution: it is the subjunctive mor-
phology itself that contributes the reportive interpretation. The main difﬁculty then becomes the
formulation of a uniform, compositional semantics of the reportive subjunctive morpheme that (i)
turns an entire clause into a report, but (ii) dissolves if the clause in question is overtly embedded.
We propose such an interpretation in terms of van der Sandt’s (1992) presupposition-as-anaphora
theory in DRT. Our principal inspiration is the similarly uniform and presuppositional account by
Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004), which we modify in various (technical) respects.
3.2. A presuppositional semantics for the reportive subjunctive
Syntactically we assume that mood takes scope over the entire clause at LF, i.e. the mood mor-
pheme on the verb corresponds to a sentential operator, Subj, at LF.
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(13) a. PF: Sie habe gru¨ne Augen
b. LF: [S Subj [S[NP she] [VP have green eyes] ] ]
Without a Subj the verb would be spelled out as indicative. After describing in some detail the
semantics of Subj we will return to Greek. The idea will then be that in a Greek ﬁnite clause,
as in German, Subj surfaces on the main verb as an mood morpheme, the optative. Finally, to
describe the reportive interpretations of independent AcIs, we’ll assume that in an inﬁnitive main
verb, Subj cannot be spelled out overtly.
Semantically, the challenge is now ﬁrst to deﬁne the semantic contribution of Subj in such a way
that the three utterances in (14) come out equivalent. (We are switching to an easier, and purely
abstract example, merely for ease of presentation.)
(14) Mary was complaining about the meeting.
a. [Subj [somebody left]]
b. She said that [somebody left]
c. She said that [Subj [somebody left]]
All three mean simply that Mary said that someone left (the meeting set up in the context). We
deﬁne the contribution of Subj in a fairly conservative extension of DRT with presuppositions,
lambdas and higher-order intensional predicates and discourse referents.
As usual in DRT, we describe this semantic contribution at the representational DRS level. The
model-theoretic interpretation of DRSs is entirely straightforward and hence uninteresting. In the
theory of presupposition-as-anaphora, interpretation is a two-stage process (not counting model-
theoretic interpretation). The ﬁrst stage is the translation from a syntactic LF to a preliminary
(higher-order, intensional) DRS (PrelDRS). The difference between PrelDRSs and ﬁnal, output
DRSs is that presuppositions are represented in situ in a PrelDRS. Hence, the PrelDRS construc-
tion stage can (and should) be spelled out compositionally. The second stage consists in merging
the PrelDRS with the context and resolving any presuppositions. This typically involves moving
presupposed content around, and, for instance, enriching the context by accommodation, as dic-
tated by pragmatic principles. This resolution stage eventually results in an updated output DRS,
which will serve as input context for the interpretation of the next sentence.
So the clause under the scope of Subj in (14a) will be assigned the following preliminary DRS,
based on the logical representations of its constituents someone and left. Given that the sentence
does not contain presupposition triggers (we’re disregarding the past tense), this would be its ﬁnal
output DRS as well. As for notation, we will suppress types (as well as syntactic structure and
category labels), and use T ( ) for the translation from LF to the logical PrelDRS language.
(15) T (somebody)=λXet
x
X(x)
T (left)=leaveet
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T (somebody left)=
x
leave(x)
Adding the Subj operator turns this DRS into a largely presuppositional structure:
(16) T ([Subj [somebody left]])=
pst
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
The at issue contribution in (16) is only a propositional variable (type st, a function from possible
worlds to {0, 1}). The dashed box represents the unresolved presuppositional content. Strictly
speaking there are two existential presuppositions here: (i) we’re presupposing the existence of a
proposition p, which is presupposed to be the proposition that someone left; and (ii) we presuppose
the existence of a source x, someone who said that p (i.e., say(x,p) means that x stands in the
indirect-discourse-saying-relation to proposition p). As usual in the theory of presupposition-as-
anaphora, we see that the presupposition binds the at issue variable, that is, what the at issue p is
will be determined by presupposition resolution.
On a technical note: it may be tempting to formulate the contribution of Subj as a single lambda
term (as did Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004), but this won’t work because, for ξ a variable of
type t, and α a DRS (also of type t), (λξ.∧ξ)(α) does not denote the same proposition as ∧α. So
we’re stuck with adding a primitive construction rule for Subj, akin to (and reducible to, if desired)
Heim and Kratzer’s (1998) intensional functional application rule.
Now, consider ﬁrst the case where [Subj[somebody left]] as translated in (16) is used as an inde-
pendent sentence, i.e. the UID case in (14a). In that case, the compositional translation phase for
the sentence is over so we move on to stage two, adding the PrelDRS to the context and looking
for antecedents to bind our two presuppositions to:
(17) Mary was complaining about the meeting. Subj [ somebody left ]
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m
complain(m)
⊕
p?s,t?
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
=
m
complain(m)
p?s,t?
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
Before we go on resolving the two presuppositions, note that there is something unusual about
this PrelDRS. DRS conditions are supposed to be statements, expressions of facts and relations
between discourse referents and/or subDRSs – in Montagovian terms, conditions should be ex-
pressions of type t. But the condition p in (17) is of type st, which doesn’t really make sense as a
condition. Now, the reason this at issue p is there in the ﬁrst place is because we want to be able
to embed the subjunctive clause under a saying verb, as we will see in detail shortly. There are
a number of potential remedies for this situation. Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004) effectively
redeﬁne the merge operation (⊕) to delete conditions of type st in the main DRS. A more drastic
alternative would be to simply give up the idea of deﬁning a uniform contribution for the subjunc-
tive in embedded and free sentences, and thus undermine the ideal of a compositional PrelDRS
translation. For now we follow Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø, and leave an independent motivation
of this stipulation for future research.12 In other words, the result of the modiﬁed merge operation
is (18):
(18)
m
complain(m)
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
We now look for an antecedent speaker (y) and an antecedent proposition (p), or else accommodate.
We can bind the source y in a context where it’s clear who is reported to be speaking. These
12At Sinn und Bedeutung 18, Todor Koev suggested that maybe it’s not so bad to leave the st proposition p (i.e.
the proposition that somebody left) ﬂoating around in the main DRS context. Arguably, it could be pragmatically
reinterpreted as indicating that p is an issue. In other words, we pragmatically turn p into the statement ‘it is an issue
whether p is actually true’ (p ??∨p). Note that the more straightforward transformation, from p to the statement ‘p
is true’ (p ?∨ p) makes too strong predictions – it doesn’t follow from the subjunctive UID statement in (14a) that
someone actually left. It remains to be checked whether the suggested weaker implication, that it is an issue whether
someone left, is generally valid.
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are precisely the contexts where we typically ﬁnd UIDs: stretches of reported discourse, clearly
attributed to some salient contextual source, either implicitly or by a preceding canonical indirect
(or direct) discourse. In this case, we just learned that Mary was complaining, so she is a salient
speech act source for y to bind to: m = y.
Next, to bind p we would need a salient propositional discourse referent in the main DRS universe.
Moreover, this antecedent proposition would have to be the proposition that somebody left, as
speciﬁed by the ﬁnal presuppositional content condition. There is no explicit antecedent to bind
to, but it is easily accommodated. In fact, assuming the existence of a proposition that is (equal
to) the proposition that someone left is completely costless, in the sense that it doesn’t add any
information to the common ground. It is an a priori given that every possible proposition “exists”
(which says nothing about whether or not it is true). In addition to this “free” accommodation, we
then only need to accommodate the remaining condition, say(y, p), i.e. we’re accommodating that
y – or rather m, its previously established antecedent – said that p.
?
m
complain(m)
p
say(m,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
?
m p
complain(m)
say(m,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)







=
m
complain(m)
say(m,∧
x
leave(x)
)







In this way we get the correct ﬁnal output representation: i.e., the contextually salient source
(Mary) said that someone left.
To show that this semantics, without any further modiﬁcation, also works for the case where the
subjunctive clause is overtly embedded, i.e. (14c), we add the following standard lexical entries
for indirect discourse. We’re assuming, again, the two-place relation say (of type (st)et), and we
analyze the complementizer as a vacuous operator, i.e. an identity function of type (st)st:
(19) T (said)=λq?s,t?λz.say(z, q) ; T (that)=λq?s,t?.q
To interpret an indicative complement we need, again, something like Heim and Kratzer (1998)
intensional functional application rule. We will assume a rule that says: if we want to feed a type
t argument, in this case a DRS, to a function that takes only st, simply add an ∧ to lift the type
of the argument. We can now combine all the lexical items above to get a proper, compositional
PrelDRS representation for (14b), the overt indicative report:
(20) [Mary [said [that [somebody left]]]] ?=(14b)?
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msay(y,∧
x
leave(x)
)
Since there are no presuppositions, adding this PrelDRS to the context comes down to adding the
global condition complain(m). Comparing this with the output derived above we see that an overt
indicative report indeed comes out equivalent to an unembedded subjunctive main clause.
On to the embedded subjunctive, (14c). Based on its LF and our lexical translation rules we get
the following PrelDRS:
(21) [Mary [said [that [Subj[somebody left]]]] ?=(14b)?
m
say(m,p)
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
We add it to the context, and look for antecedents for y and p. As before, y will be bound to Mary,
the known speech act source from the context, and p will be accommodated, mostly for free (given
the a priori existence of the proposition that someone left). At that point we can further clean up the
representation by removing a superﬂuous occurrence of say(m, p), and eliminating the variable p
for readability:
?
m
complain(m)
say(m,p)
p
say(m,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)
?
m p
complain(m)
say(m,p)
say(m,p)
p=∧
x
leave(x)







=
m
complain(m)
say(m,∧
x
leave(x)
)







So, with only a minor tweak to the merge operation (remove non-t conditions), we captured the
contribution of the subjunctive morpheme (corresponding to Konjunktiv in German and optative
in Greek) in such a way that we can predict the key data, viz. the equivalence of overt indicative
reports, overt subjunctive reports and independent main clause subjunctive. Apart from the merge
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operation, we have relied only on standard DRT and presupposition theory.13 In particular, our
PrelDRS were constructed fully compositionally, and uniformly on the basis of a single Subj
operator.
Our analysis, designed for the German Indirektheitskonjuntiv, applies to the ancient Greek oblique
optatives out of the box. Both phenomena show the same reportive subjunctive behavior: when
embedded in a report they add nothing to the truth conditions, but when they occur in unembedded
main clause they turn a simple assertion ϕ into a semantically indirect report, x said that ϕ, in
which the source, x is to be determined anaphorically. We can sum up our analysis of the reportive
subjunctive (in German and Greek) as follows:
(22) a. LF: [. . . [S Subj [S[NP someone] [VPleft]]]]
b. PF: Subj? optative/Konjunktiv morphology on the main verb
c. compositional semantics: T (Subj ϕ) =
pst
p y
say(y,p)
p=∧T (ϕ)
3.3. The AcI at the syntax–semantics interface
We’ve analyzed the optative variant of UID in ancient Greek by interpreting the optative mood
marker generally as a presupposition trigger. But what about the AcI marked cases of UID? There
is no analogue in German, or, as far as we are aware, in any modern Romance or Germanic lan-
guage. We will analyze Greek unembedded AcIs as potentially harboring the same Subj, but then
not overtly realized. This means that we have to treat AcIs in Greek as syntactically on a par
with (dependent or independent) clauses. Note that ancient Greek differs in this regard from many
other European languages, where inﬁnitival complements are generally more like VPs, or in any
case cannot stand alone as independent main clauses. We turn to the peculiar morphosyntactic
properties of the ancient Greek inﬁnitive to explain how this exceptional behavior.
An inﬁnitive is of course non-ﬁnite, meaning that it lacks agreement. But the classical Greek
inﬁnitive differs in one important respect from its modern Romance and Germanic counterpart:
although it does not inﬂect for person and number, it does inﬂect for tense (future vs. non-future).
Hence, Spyropoulos (2005; 2007) proposes that the ancient Greek inﬁnitive comes with a “defec-
tive T” (marking tense but not person), but a T nonetheless. Ancient Greek inﬁnitival complements
therefore are somewhere in between the more familiar modern inﬁnitives, which can never have
overt subjects, and full ﬁnite clauses. In particular, unlike modern inﬁnitives, which need their
(covert) subjects to be controlled by a matrix argument, ancient Greek inﬁnitival clauses can occur
on their own, as unembedded main clauses.
13On a few points our formalization is more conservative than that of Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004).
C. Bary & E. Maier Unembedded Indirect Discourse
Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 18
Edited by Urtzi Etxeberria, Anamaria Fa˘la˘us¸, Aritz Irurtzun & Bryan Leferman 90
This then is the reason why inﬁnitival UID is syntactically possible in ancient Greek, but not in, say,
German. The defective T hypothesis also explains why the overt inﬁnitival subject is always in the
accusative. Nominative case is usually assumed to be licensed speciﬁcally by agreement features
in T, so that’s out. Ferraresi and Goldbach (2003) argue, for Latin, where they discuss some similar
AcI/UID-like constructions,14 that the accusative is simply the unmarked case that gets plugged in
by default here. According to Spyropoulos, it’s the covert complementizer in the inﬁnitival clause
that, for reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper, assigns accusative case. For our current
purposes it doesn’t really matter where the accusative comes from. The most important thing is
that inﬁnitives have a defective T which allows them to have an overt, uncontrolled subject, and
form a genuine CP that can be embedded under a saying verb, or occur on its own.
To explain why unembedded AcIs in ancient Greek are interpreted reportatively, i.e. as UID,
we posit that inﬁnitival clauses, like regular, ﬁnite CPs, can be modiﬁed by our presupposition-
triggering Subj operator.15 For morphological reasons, this Subj however doesn’t get spelled out
overtly on an inﬁnitive main verb in ancient Greek. There just happens to be no optative inﬁnitive
form.
In sum, we predict the unembedded AcI whose LF and PF are schematically represented in En-
glish below to be semantically equivalent to the earlier three report variants from 3.2, i.e., the
unembedded subjunctive, the embedded indicative, and the embedded subjunctive:
(23) a. LF: [S Subj [S[NPsomeone] [VPleave.inf] ]]
b. PF: Someone.acc to leave
c. interpretation: she said that someone left
3.4. Generic reporting
With our semantics of UID fully spelled out, we can turn to some actual text and check concrete
predictions. For instance, the proposed presuppositional interpretation of Subj predicts that we
need to ﬁnd in the context an antecedent source for the report. But what if the context doesn’t offer
a concrete, salient, and plausible source? According to the theory of presupposition-as-anaphora,
we ﬁrst look for a suitable antecedent, but if we don’t ﬁnd one, we accommodate. In the case of our
example UID, we had a context where Mary was complaining, so we derived that she was likely
the one who said that someone left. In an empty context, all we’d conclude would be that there
was a source who said that someone left.
In other words, the concrete prediction of our theory is that a UID ϕ in a context without a salient
14Further research on UID in Latin remains to be carried out. In any case, Latin patterns with Greek in having a
rich, near-ﬁnite inﬁnitive (with similarly defective T), and in having an AcI construction that can occur unembedded.
15It’s not clear if (and if so, why) unembedded AcIs must contain a Subj, or whether embedded AcIs also contain
one.
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speech act source, is interpreted as a kind of generic report, or hearsay: it is said that ϕ, or allegedly
ϕ.
We can check this in our ancient Greek corpus. Consider the following passage from Herodotus.
(24) Λαβ?ντες δ? α?τ?ν ο? Π?ρσαι ?γαγον παρ? Κ?ρον. ?Ο δ? συνν?σας πυρ?ν µεγ?λην
?νεβ?βασε ?π? α?τ?ν τ?ν Κρο?σ?ν τε ?ν π?δη?σι δεδεµ?νον κα? δ?ς ?πτ? Λυδ?ν παρ?
α?τ?ν πα?δας, ?ν ν?ω? ?χων ε?τε δ? ?κροθ?νια τα?τα καταγιε?ν θε?ν ?τεω? δ?, ε?τε
κα? ε?χ?ν ?πιτελ?σαι θ?λων, ε?τε κα? πυθ?µενος τ?ν Κρο?σον ε?ναι θεοσεβ?α το?δε
ε?νεκεν ?νεβ?βασε ?π? τ?ν πυρ?ν, βουλ?µενος ε?δ?ναι ε? τ?ς µιν δαιµ?νων ??σεται το?
µ? ζ?οντα κατακαυθ?ναι. Τ?ν µ?ν δ? ποι?ειν τα?τα. Τ?? δ? Κρο?σω? ?στε?τι ?π? τ?ς
πυρ?ς ?σελθε?ν, κα?περ ?ν κακ?? ??ντι τοσο?τω?, τ? το? Σ?λωνος, ?ς ο? ε?η σ?ν θε??
ε?ρηµ?νον, τ? ?µηδ?να ε?ναι τ?ν ζω?ντων ?λβιον?. ?Ως δ? ?ρα µιν προσστ?ναι το?το,
?νενεικ?µεν?ν τε κα? ?ναστεν??αντα ?κ πολλ?ς ?συχ?ης ?ς τρ?ς ?νοµ?σαι ?Σ?λω-
ν?. Κα? τ?ν Κ?ρον ?κο?σαντα κελε?σαι το?ς ?ρµην?ας ?πειρ?σθαι τ?ν Κρο?σον τ?να
το?τον ?πικαλ?οιτο, κα? το?ς προσελθ?ντας ?πειρωτ?ν. Κρο?σον δ? τ?ως µ?ν σιγ?ν
?χειν ε?ρωτ?µενον, µετ? δ?, ?ς ?ναγκ?ζετο, ε?πε?ν . . . ? Hdt. 1.86
‘The Persians took him and brought him to Cyrus, who erected a pyre and mounted Croe-
sus atop it, bound in chains, with twice seven sons of the Lydians beside him. Cyrus may
have intended to sacriﬁce him as a victory-offering to some god, or he may have wished
to fulﬁll a vow, or perhaps he had heard that Croesus was pious and put him atop the pyre
to ﬁnd out if some divinity would deliver him from being burned alive. So Cyrus did this.
As Croesus stood on the pyre, even though he was in such a wretched position it occurred
to him that Solon had spoken with god’s help when he had said that no one among the
living is fortunate. When this occurred to him, he heaved a deep sigh and groaned aloud
after long silence, calling out three times the name “Solon.” Cyrus heard and ordered the
interpreters to ask Croesus who he was invoking. They approached and asked, but Croesus
kept quiet at their questioning, until ﬁnally they forced him and he said . . . ’
After a series of ﬁnite forms, Herodotus switches to unembedded inﬁnitives (underlined). As-
suming that these come with a Subj at LF, they trigger reportive presuppositions. Apparently,
Herodotus wants to mark the fact that he didn’t get this information ﬁrst hand. But it is not at all
clear in the context who told Herodotus all this. We thus predict a hearsay interpretation: it is said
that (or: I’ve been told that) he did the following. Allegedly, as Croesus stood on the pyre . . . it
occurred to him . . . .
Given the lack of native speakers, it is not trivial to prove that this is indeed the intended reading of
the passage, but it does at least offer an initially plausible explanation for the occurrence of these
AcIs. Further research is required to thoroughly check this and other predictions.
4. Conclusion: The position of UID in the taxonomy of speech and thought reports
Inspired by the Greek data, we want to argue for the following picture:
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reported speech & thought
quotational
direct
?
“free indirect”
intensional
indirect
unembedded embedded
We have argued that within the class of indirect speech and thought reports a distinction is to
be made between embedded and unembedded ones (parallel to a distinction within the class of
direct discourse reports into framed and unframed ones).16 Furthermore, we have shown that
unembedded indirect discourse is not to be confused with what is traditionally called “free indirect
discourse”. The latter name is misleading for the construction it is used for since it suggests
that that is indirect discourse that is free (i.e. syntactically unembedded). FID – to keep using
the standard terminology – is free, but it is not indirect discourse. UID, by contrast, is indirect
discourse that is free and hence would be more deserving of that title. We believe that recognizing
the class of unembedded indirect discourse also helps us obtain a clearer picture of what FID is
semantically, viz. something that should not be treated as a kind of indirect discourse.
It is important to see that the point we are making is not (just) terminological. Of course, we
can invent a term that covers both FID and UID. ‘Not purely direct, unembedded speech/thought
reports’ would capture both. Or one could propose to stretch the use of the term “free indirect
discourse” so as to include not only what is traditionally called so, but also the phenomenon of
unembedded indirect discourse. However, what we hope to have shown in this paper is that the
resulting group does not form a semantically homogeneous class. To the contrary, the two are
fundamentally different: FID is quotational/direct-ish, whereas UID is intentional/indirect-ish.
Let’s now return to the question of the existence of FID in ancient Greek raised at the very begin-
ning of this paper. We clearly have not proven that FID does not exist in this language (it is quite
difﬁcult to prove that something does not exist in a dead language). But the fact that we have never
seen clear examples of this technique suggests to us that it does not exist. This suggestion is easily
falsiﬁable: if only an ancient Greek example is found that is reportive without being syntactically
embedded and which furthermore has an exclamative and an indexical temporal adverb like ?χθ?ς
echthes ‘yesterday’ that has a protagonist-oriented reading, we would happily acknowledge the
existence of FID in this language. We think that the burden of the proof is with the scholars who
claim that it exists.
We suspect that the existence of UID in ancient Greek may in some cases have contributed to the
16Most (if not all) unembedded ones in ancient Greek are speech rather than thought reports.
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impression that the superﬁcially similar and misleadingly named stylistic device FID is present in
this language. What we have shown in this paper is that on a closer look the two are fundamentally
different phenomena.
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